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It is a well-established fact that monetary institutions help shape the 
macroeconomic environment of countries by stabilizing prices. In the 
early 1990s, transition economies had the opportunity to rearrange their 
monetary institutions to better achieve low levels of inflation. Those 
economies had several prominent monetary arrangements to choose from, 
such as sovereign central banks or currency boards. This paper surveys the 
monetary institutions currently in place in several transition economies 
and compares them based on their ability to control inflation. More 
specifically, we intend to test whether the transition economies have better 
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1- Introduction   
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the rise of independence movements in the Baltics 
and other Soviet republics led to the implosion of the USSR in December 1991. The 
USSR’s implosion was followed by the birth of a multitude of self-governing states. 
These newly-freed, and self-governing, states are referred to as transition economies 
because they are transitioning from centrally-planned economies to market-based 
economies. Following their independence, almost all of the transition economies created 
their own national currency and established a central bank to enact a national monetary 
policy. As mentioned by Schuler (1996), the conventional view among monetary 
economists at the time of the formation of the transition economies was that every 
independent country should have its own central bank in order to conduct an independent 
monetary policy. 
In contrast, around the same time of the independence movement, the leaders of 
eleven Western European countries were busy signing the Maastricht Treaty, which 
called for the creation of a single European currency and a common European Central 
Bank. The European Central Bank was created to implement one single monetary policy 
to all members of the European Monetary Union. This new central bank is completely 
independent of any political influence and has the overriding role to achieve price 
stability in the Euroland.
1  
The fact that eleven countries gave up their monetary sovereignty to the European 
Central Bank has created a surge in the academic literature on discretionary monetary 
policy. Some economists, such as Feldstein (2000), speculate that the loss of monetary 
                                                 
1 Euroland is conventionally used to refer to the area governed by the European Central Bank, which 
includes the area of its member nations.  
  3
autonomy would hurt the economies of the member nations by not allowing them to 
optimally respond to asymmetric shocks. Other economists such as Fratianni and von 
Hagen (1993) argue that the commitments to price stability, which some countries were 
lacking prior to the union, could contribute to more sound monetary policy in Europe. 
According to these authors, the member nations that lacked commitment to price stability 
would gain credibility by adopting the new monetary institution. In other words, the high-
inflation countries could use the European Monetary Union as means to achieve reduced 
inflationary pressures. 
Historically, most countries in transition have faced extreme difficulty in 
maintaining price stability. The most predominant explanation, as supported by Sachs 
(1997), is that the transition economies have heightened need for increased government 
expenditures, which has put pressure on their monetary authorities to print more money. 
In other words, the fiscal imbalances, which are caused by the inability of the newly-
created governments to collect sufficient revenue, put pressure on the central banks to 
collect seigniorage revenue. As noted by Sachs (1997) the resulting high inflation rates 
can primarily be attributed to the rapid increase in the money supply.  
The aim of this paper is to test whether the transition economies have better 
inflation performance when they import the monetary policy of a credible central bank. 
For example, we test to see whether transition economies that adopt a currency board or 
de facto exchange rate peg, experience more stable and/or lower levels of inflation than 
the transition economies that use more discretionary monetary policy. We also test to see 
whether transition economies that are on the fast track to join the European Monetary  
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Union experience lower levels of inflation than the other transition economies.
 2  Clearly 
the real heart of the issue revolves around the degree of discretionary policy that the 
transition economies have.  
First, we propose that those transition economies that limit their ability to use 
discretionary policy (adopting a currency board or experiencing a de facto exchange rate 
peg) will fare better in their attempts to control inflation. Our results confirm this 
proposition, as we find that transition economies operating with a currency board or 
classified as having a de facto exchange rate peg, experience lower inflation rates relative 
to transition economies without such monetary institutions. Second, we propose that 
being on the fast track to join the European Monetary Union may also provide a 
discipline effect on those countries monetary regimes, as the countries have to meet 
certain criteria before joining the European Union. However, we also propose that the 
fast track to join the European Monetary Union may not significantly impact the inflation 
performance of transition economies, because it is only an announcement to join at a later 
date, and may not significantly tie the hands of the monetary authority to limit 
discretionary policies. Our results show that the transition economies that are on the fast 
track to join the European Monetary Union do not experience significantly lower 
inflation rates, relative to those countries that are not on the fast track. 
This paper will proceed by first presenting a brief survey of the different types of 
institutions that are in effect in the existing transition economies.
3 In particular, we 
                                                 
2 We refer to countries being on the ‘fast track’ to join the European Monetary Union as those countries 
that joined the European Union in 2004. 
3 The IMF classifies the following countries as being transition economies:  Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia.  
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characterize currency board institutions and review the literature on the possible effects 
they have on the economic performance of transition countries. Next, we examine the 
relationship between inflation and economic growth in the transition economies to 
evaluate if a macro policy that aims at reducing inflation provides a better environment 
for economic growth in those countries. We then proceed to compare the economic 
performance of twenty-six transition economies by measuring the mean and variance of 
their inflation rates across the period 1995-2002. This analysis will compare and contrast 
the performance of transition economies that have adopted a currency board or a de facto-
peg regime to those using a traditional central-banking system with more discretionary 
power. Finally, we perform a panel study to test the effect that adopting a currency board, 
experiencing a de facto exchange rate peg, or being on the fast track to join the European 
Monetary Union has on inflation in selected transition economies.  
 
2- Central Banks versus Currency Boards 
According to public choice theory, an institution’s performance is conditional on the 
incentives that the individuals within the institution face. For example, Friedman (1982) 
emphasizes the importance of looking at the incentives that monetary policy makers face. 
According to Friedman, the forces that control the behavior of the policy maker are not 
necessarily in-line with the social welfare function of the monetary institution. For 
example, a central banker with less discretion in implementing monetary policy could 
better achieve economic stability. Similarly, studies by Toma (1982), and Shughart and 
Tollison (1983) found that the lack of constraints on central bankers result in an 
overproduction of money beyond the optimal welfare level, which could hurt economic  
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stability. Therefore, the lack of constraints on central bankers, which allows them to 
enjoy more discretion in implementing monetary policy, could result in a less (rather than 
more) stable economy.   
When the transition economies seceded from the former Soviet Union, the new 
independent governments’ revenue requirements were substantial. Sachs (1997) analyzes 
in detail why Poland, as did many of its neighbors, experienced a higher budget deficit 
while transitioning to the market-based economy. Aizenman (1987) suggests that greater 
government demand for revenue will increase the use of inflation as a revenue-generating 
device. Clearly, the choice of the monetary institution, which affects the discretionary 
ability of the transition-economy policy makers, is an important determinant in the 
overall performance of the monetary authority’s ability to control inflation. More 
specifically, the institutions that limit the monetary authority’s incentive to cater to 
revenue-generating pressures will theoretically allow for more control of inflation. 
Most of the transition economies chose to implement a sovereign central bank as 
their monetary institution. The traditional socialist monobank system, which had no 
distinction between central banks and state-owned commercial banks, was transformed to 
a two tier banking system with a sovereign central bank and a separate commercial 
banking system. The new central banks use discretionary monetary policy and, according 
to Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002), have a significant degree of legal 
independence from the government. The designed independence of the central banks 
shows that the governments of the transition economies had good intentions to protect the 
new central banks from political and budgetary pressures. Nevertheless, as stated by 
Toma (2001), the independence that governments attribute to central banks does not  
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create enough constraints for the policy maker to effectively enact policies in the interest 
of the general public. Toma’s observation would imply that the independence granted to 
the transition economies’ monetary institutions is not enough to prevent policy makers 
from rapidly increasing the money supply.  
In an attempt to further reduce the influence of political motives in the money 
supply process, some governments chose to restrict their discretionary use of monetary 
policy by adopting another form of monetary institution—a currency board. This 
alternative form of monetary institution was adopted by four of the transition economies 
(Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Currency boards effectively 
tie the hands of the monetary authorities by inhibiting the fiduciary issue of their 
currency, as the backing of the currency must be at least 100%. More specifically, a 
currency board is required to exchange domestic currency for foreign reserve currency at 
a specified and fixed rate. To perform this function the board is required to hold financial 
assets in the foreign reserve currency at least equal to the value of the domestic currency 
outstanding. Another characteristic of a currency board (unlike a central bank) is that it 
cannot function as a "lender of last resort" to the state treasury or commercial banks, 
implying that the board cannot monetize the government's budgetary deficits. 
At the time that the transition economies were deciding on what monetary 
institutions to adopt, the International Monetary Fund dismissed the currency board idea. 
In particular, Nenovsky (2001) documents the skepticism of the IMF during Estonia and 
Bulgaria’s early attempts to adopt the currency board institution. The IMF’s initial 
rejection of currency boards was based on the notion that the currency boards would not 
allow flexibility in offsetting country-specific shocks, which would eventually lead to the  
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deterioration of their economic performance. Moreover, the traditional central bank 
institution just seemed to fit better with the mainstream ideology of the IMF’s senior 
economists.  
However, the IMF position was relaxed by the findings of Gosh, Gulde, and Wolf 
(1998, 2000), all economists at the IMF, which show that countries with currency boards 
enjoy lower inflation levels, as well as, higher output growth relative to countries with 
self-governing central banks. Recently, many other economists have been analyzing the 
economic performance of countries under currency boards. In particular, a recent event 
study by Hanke (2002) found compelling evidence supporting the notion that transition 
economies that adopt currency boards experience improved economic performance.   
However, all economists do not agree on the benefits from adopting a currency 
board. In particular, some economists, such as Nouriel Roubini (1998), believe that 
currency boards are “weak” institutions with very mixed economic outcomes. Therefore, 
the debate is still on going, and the following sections will attempt to shed some light on 
the economic performances of transition economies with currency boards. 
 
3- Economic Performances in Transition Economies. 
The academic literature such as Fisher (1993), Motley (1994), and Fisher, Sahay, and 
Vegh (2002) tends to find a negative relationship between inflation rates and economic 
growth. The first question that is raised in this section is whether or not this relationship 
holds for the transition economies. More specifically, are lower levels of inflation 
associated with higher output growth in the transition economies?  
[Figure 1 about here]  
  9
A simple analysis of the inflation and output growth performances of the 
transition economies is performed to try and answer this question. Specifically, we 
analyze the relationship between each transition economy’s average annual inflation rate 
with their average annual GDP growth rate, from 1995-2002. The results of this analysis 
are presented in the scatter plot diagram illustrated in Figure 1. The scatter plot diagram 
shows that the inverse relationship between inflation and GDP growth exists in the 
transition economies. Therefore, any macroeconomic policy that encourages lower levels 
of inflation is likely to promote (or at least be consistent with) economic growth in the 
transition economies.  
Next, our analysis will focus on determining which type of monetary institution is 
best for achieving low and stable inflation rates. Hanke and Schuler (1992, 1994) argue 
that the nations that are trying to become market economies are placing too much 
responsibility on the central bank. According to the authors, in order for transition 
economies to issue a fiat currency that retains its purchasing power (value), the central 
banks need to be credible and effectively control domestic prices. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, and the distrust of the Ruble, none of the transition economies’ central 
banks seemed to possess the required credibility to supply a sound and valuable currency. 
Generally, the newly created national central banks had yet to acquire a credible 
reputation of following low-inflation policies, and the public perception of these central 
banks was that they would inevitably fail at producing low and stable rates of inflation. 
Previous papers, such as Hanke (2002), look at the economic performance of 
various developing countries around the globe that have switched from a central bank to a 
currency board, and find that their economic performance improved after the switch. The  
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contribution of this paper is that it is the first to explicitly focus on all the transition 
countries and statistically compare their performances in maintaining stable and low 
inflation rates with the structure of their monetary institutions. Our objective is to 
examine whether or not transition countries with currency boards offer sounder money, in 
other words lower inflation, than transition countries with central banks. Also, we expand 
the comparative analysis to incorporate those transition economies that experienced a de 
facto exchange rate peg, as classified by Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002). We consider 
both of these characteristics to be institutional factors that will lead to lower and more 
stable inflation rates. Countries that adopted a currency board regime or experienced a de 
facto exchange rate peg will be referred to as “non-discretionary regimes.” 
To perform this analysis we compute the average annual inflation rates and 
inflation variances for twenty-six transition economies. Then, our analysis proceeds by 
statistically comparing the inflation variances of transition economies with non-
discretionary regimes to the inflation variances of transition economies operating under a 
central bank system, which gives more opportunity to employ discretionary policy. 
Finally, we perform the same comparisons using the average annual inflation rates of the 
two groups of transition economies.  
Table 1 presents the variance of inflation rates, as well as, the average annual 
inflation rates of twenty-six transition economies for which data were available for the 
time period, 1995-2002.
4 The transition economies with non-discretionary regimes are 
                                                 
4  The data come from the IMF and are available for twenty-six transition economies. Variance and average 
inflation rates are taken from the period 1995-2002. In 1995, Estonia and Lithuania were already under a 
currency board system. Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina abandoned the central banking system in the 
summer of 1997. For those countries central bank observations go from 1995-1996, and currency board 
observations go from 1998-2002. The year 1997 was unclassifiable to either of the categories due to the 
annual data availability.   
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highlighted in bold and italic print, and if the switch from central bank to currency board 
occurred during the sample period the data for both periods are separately reported for 
comparison purposes. Furthermore, to motivate simple comparisons across countries, the 
transition economies are ranked based on their corresponding variance of inflation and 
average annual inflation measures.   
[Table 1 about here] 
  More formal comparisons of the two groups are presented in the last rows of 
Table 1. The comparisons are first motivated by averaging the inflation measures of the 
transition countries with central banks, and also, the transition countries with non-
discretionary regimes. Then, difference in variances and difference in means tests are 
performed on the two groups. More specifically, the difference in the inflation variances 
is measured as the average variance of inflation under central banking minus the average 
variance of inflation under non-discretionary regimes; while the difference in the 
inflation means is measured as the average inflation under central banking minus the 
average inflation under non-discretionary regimes. 
  The difference in the average inflation variances between the two groups is found 
to be positive. This result implies that inflation under central banking is more volatile 
than inflation under currency board and de facto pegs. In other words, our results imply 
that the regimes with more discretionary power in monetary policy result in increase 
volatility of inflation when compared to non-discretionary regimes. In order to check the 
significance of the findings, a difference in variance test was performed, which included 
the null hypothesis that the variances are not statistically different. Using a standard two-
tailed F-test we can reject the null hypothesis of equal variances at the one-percent level  
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of confidence. Therefore, we find that inflation is significantly more stable in countries 
with non-discretionary regimes than in countries with central banking systems. This 
result is in accord with Hanke and Schuler’s (1994) claim that central banks will not 
produce stable currencies in the transition economies. 
The difference in the annual average inflation between the two groups is also 
found to be positive. This result implies that inflation under central banking is higher than 
inflation under currency boards or de facto pegs. In other words, our results show that 
regimes with more discretionary power in monetary policy produce more inflation 
relative to non-discretionary regimes. In order to check the significance of this finding, a 
difference in means test was performed, which included the null hypothesis that the 
average inflation rates under non-discretionary regimes is lower than the average 
inflation rate under a central bank system. Using a standard t-test we find that inflation is 
significantly lower in countries with non-discretionary regimes than in countries with 
central banking systems. 
In summary, our results show that transition economies operating under non-
discretionary regimes experience lower and more stable inflation than their counterparts 
experience under a central banking system. Our results support the findings of Hanke and 
Schuler (1992), which argue that countries gain substantial credibility by adopting a 
currency board, where the gain in credibility is exemplified by a sounder money (a lower, 
and more stable inflation rate). Our findings are also in line with the findings of Gosh, 
Gulde, and Wolf (1998, 2000) that countries with currency boards enjoy lower inflation 
levels. Furthermore, our finding that currency boards control inflation conforms with the 
results of Hanke (2002) which shows that developing countries adopting currency board  
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regimes experience lower inflation. Finally, our incorporation of de facto exchange rate 
pegs conforms with the results of Bleaney and Francisco (2003), who found that only 
“hard pegs” make a difference for inflation. 
 
4-Panel Analysis of the Determinants of Inflation in Transition Countries 
In this section we analyze the determinants of inflation in transition economies. 
Particularly, extending the analysis from the previous section we will investigate the 
relationship between adopting a non-discretionary regime and inflation rates. In addition, 
we will look at the effects of other discretionary policy restraints on inflation rates. 
Specifically, we have collected panel data on twenty-five transition economies, spanning 
from 1995-2001, to test the effects that different monetary institutions have on inflation 
in the selected transition economies.
5 
We build off of the standard model of inflation, however, the empirical model that 
we use is original as it introduces the effect of adopting a currency board and 
experiencing de facto exchange rate pegs, as well as, the effect of being on the fast track 
to join the European Monetary Union. First, we expect that those transition economies 
that limit their ability to use discretionary policy (adopting a currency board or 
experiencing a de facto exchange rate peg) will fare better in their attempts to control 
inflation. We will add to the work of Bleaney and Francisco (2003) which shows that 
“only hard pegs make a difference.” The authors use a large sample of developing 
countries to test if hard pegs (currency boards or a shared currency) reduce inflation. The 
                                                 
5 The 25 transition countries included in our study are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 




authors find that “hard pegs significantly reduce inflation, while “soft” pegs, those that 
are flexible, do not confer any monetary discipline. The author’s sample of developing 
countries excludes countries in transition, so our current sample, which focuses solely on 
countries in transition, will serve as a robustness check to the author’s findings within 
their chosen sample. 
Second, we propose that being on the fast track to join the European Monetary 
Union may also provide a discipline effect on those countries monetary regimes, as the 
countries have to meet certain convergence criteria before joining the European Union. 
However, it could also be that the fast track to join the European Monetary Union may 
not significantly impact the inflation performance of transition economies, because it is 
only an announcement to join at a later date, and may not significantly tie the hands of 
the monetary authority to limit discretionary policies.  
We used the term fast track to refer to transition countries that have joined the 
European Union in 2004. More specifically, in 1999, the fifteen member states of the 
European Union announced that eight transition countries: Poland, Hungary, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, and Latvia will be able to join the 
Union in 2004. In December 2002, the member states of the European Union gathered in 
Copenhagen, to begin the biggest enlargement of the European Union. There, the eight 
countries from the former Eastern Soviet bloc were officially invited to join the European 
Union in 2004. In April 2003, in Athens, the eight new members signed the Treaty of 
Accession to the European Union. After ratification of the treaty, the eight new members 
were permitted to join the existing fifteen on May 1st, 2004 (which has since occurred). 
Those eight countries are referred to as being on the fast track to join the European  
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Union. Among those eight countries, Lithuania and Estonia have adopted a currency 
board system and the remaining six countries on the fast track to join the European Union 
have chosen to stay under a central banking system.  
  The interesting case will be to test the effect of being on the fast track to join the 
European Monetary Union has on inflation. This is interesting because it does not involve 
an “institutional” change, but more of a change in the self-discipline of the government. 
We propose that the commitment of a transition economy to become a member of the 
European Union will produce credibility, as well as, disciplinary gains through the 
“acquis communautaires” set forth by the European Union. The ‘acquis communautaires’ 
include: stability of institutions; the existence of a functioning market economy; the 
ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. The announcement to meet these specified 
criteria can serve as a non-institutional force of discipline on the monetary policy of the 
transition economies and can potentially influence inflation. 
  Rogoff (1985) and Hanke and Schuler (1994) have documented how non-
institutional factors can influence inflation. Rogoff (1985) shows how a “conservative” 
central banker, or movement to stronger self discipline by primarily and explicitly 
targeting inflation, can provide the credibility needed for the monetary institution to 
implement effective policies that lead to lower inflation and more economic growth. 
Hanke and Schuler (1994) underline the “upright character” of the Czech finance 
minister, Vaclav Klaus, which helped maintain inflation rates in his country that were 
significantly lower than those experienced by the other transition economies.   
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To examine the determinants of inflation we estimate a panel regression that takes 
the following general form:
6  
Inf it = M΄itβ1 + X΄itβ2 + Ci + εit   i=1,…,N  and  t=1,…,T 
Where Inf stands for the inflation level of country i at time t, β1 and β2 are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated, M is a vector of monetary regime indicators, X is a vector of 
control variables that closely conforms to what has been previously used in the literature, 
C are the fixed effects for each country, and ε is the error term.   
  We include three monetary regime indicators.
 7 (1) Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) 
classify de facto exchange rate regimes into 13 categories based on the degree of 
exchange flexibility. More specifically, the authors assign numbers from 1 to 13, where 
the lower numbers represent the least flexible exchange regimes, and higher numbers 
represent more flexible exchange regimes. The Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) index is 
expected to carry a positive sign, showing that when exchange flexibility is increased, 
and therefore discretion is increased, the resulting inflation will be higher. (2) We include 
a control for the years in which a country had a currency board arrangement, or were 
classified by Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) to experience a de facto exchange rate peg 
(i.e. non-discretionary regimes). This variable is constructed as a dummy variable equal 
to one for the years with the above specified criteria, and zero otherwise. The non-
discretionary regime control is expected to carry a negative sign, showing that hard pegs 
lead to lower inflation. (3) Based on our definition of being on the fast track to join the 
                                                 
6 All data are from  the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database, unless stated otherwise. We 
would like to thank Jizhong Zhou for help in collecting pieces of our data set.  
7 The choice of the monetary regime is taken as exogenous following the approach of Hanke (2000) and 
Fatas and Rose (2001).  
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European Monetary Union, we include a dummy variable equal to one for those countries 
classified to be on the fast track for years after the 1999 announcement, and zero 
otherwise. The fast track control variable is expected to carry a negative sign, to show 
that the announcement to join the European Union, and the convergence criteria can act 
as a non-institutional limitation on discretionary policy and lead to less inflation. 
  Generally, the control variables include fiscal, economic, and structural influences 
on inflation. The fiscal influence is measured as the government fiscal balance as a 
percentage of GDP (Budget Deficit (% of GDP)). This variable is expected to carry a 
positive sign because of the assumption that fiscal motives drive inflation pressures, 
particularly in transition economies. We include several economic influences that are 
traditionally used to explain inflation rates. According to the economic literature on 
inflation and economic growth, such as Fisher (1993), Motley (1994), and Fisher, Sahay, 
and Vegh (2002) there is an inverse relation between economic growth and inflation. 
However, the causal relation is not agreed upon, so the annual real GDP growth rate 
(Real GDP Growth Rate (Lag 1 period)) is treated as endogenous and is expected to 
carry a negative sign. The country’s openness to trade, measured as a country’s imports 
plus exports as a percentage of GDP (Trade Volume (% of GDP)), is expected to carry a 
positive sign because countries with a larger foreign trade sector are more exposed to 
external shocks that may increase inflation. The share of the value added of agriculture in 
GDP (Agriculture Value Added (% of GDP)), is expected to carry a positive sign based 
on the arguments of Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) that the agricultural sector 
is the most difficult to tax. Following this logic, the countries with more pronounced 
agricultural sectors, may rely more on seigniorage relative to other countries, which may  
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lead to higher inflation. To account for structural influences on inflation we include the 
index of legal central bank independence (Independence of Central Bank) developed by 
Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002). The independence index is expected to carry a 
negative sign because increased independence implies that the central bank is less 
exposed to seigniorage pressure, and thus may experience lower inflation. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The estimated determinants of inflation are presented in Table 2. There are six 
regression specifications reported in Table 2 that vary by the inclusion of different 
combinations of monetary regime indicators.
8 Our base model accurately explains the 
inflation of our selected transition economies, as our R-squared measure remained 
consistently around 0.60. So we are explaining roughly 60% of the variation in the 
inflation rates of our transition economies.  
Generally, the control variables all retained the expect signs and significance 
levels throughout the regression specifications. The budget deficit was found to be 
significant in two of the six regressions (specifications [c] and [d]) and carried the 
expected positive sign, which shows that fiscal motives increase inflationary pressures in 
the transition economies. The real GDP growth (lagged one period) is significant at the 
1% level in all regressions and carried the expected negative sign, which implies that 
high growth is consistent with low inflation. The openness to trade remained significant 
at the 1% level in all regressions and exerted the expected positive influence on inflation, 
which reveals that added exposure to external shocks increases inflationary pressure. The 
share of value added in agriculture had the expected positive sign, and was significant at 
                                                 
8 All regression specifications included country fixed effects, which are available upon request to the 
authors. Also, the regressions were estimated including year fixed effects, and the results remained virtually 
unchanged from those reported in Table 2.  
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the 5% level or better in all regressions. The central bank independence measure was 
never significantly different from zero. So, the central bank’s independence was not 
found to significantly influence inflation in the sampled transition economies.  
The variables of interest in our analysis are the monetary regime indicators. The 
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) exchange rate index was included in specifications [a, b, 
e, and f]. In specifications [a] and [b], those without the non-discretionary regime control, 
the exchange rate index was significant at the 1% level and had the expected positive 
coefficient. This shows that increases in the degree of exchange rate flexibility will result 
in higher inflation. However, the exchange rate regime index lost its significance in 
specifications [e] and [f], those with the non-discretionary regime control. This confirms 
the findings of Bleaney and Francisco (2003) that really only “hard” pegs significantly 
impact inflation. 
The non-discretionary regime control was included in specifications [c, d, e, and 
f]. In specifications [c] and [d], those without the exchange rate index, the non-
discretionary regime control was significant at the 1 % level and had the expected 
negative coefficient. This result implies that countries that adopt a currency board system, 
or experience a de facto exchange rate peg, have significantly less inflation relative to 
countries that have the traditional central banking system with flexible exchange regimes. 
Again the rationale is that the currency board institution and hard pegs constrain the 
government and do not allow it to over issue its currency. More specifically, these 
arrangements constrain the ability to use discretionary policies to debt finance through 
inflation taxes. The non-discretionary regime control retained its negative sign and was 
significant at the 5% level in specifications [e] and [f], those that also included the  
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exchange rate regime index. Again this result confirms the hypothesis that only hard pegs 
matter for inflation. 
The Fast Track to Join the European Monetary Union indicator was included in 
specifications [a, c, and e]. The indicator had the expected negative sign, however, the 
estimated coefficient was never found to be significantly different from zero at 
conventional significance levels. This result implies that countries that are on the fast 
track to join the European Monetary Union do not experience lower inflation relative to 
those countries that are not on the fast track. Thus, we conclude that the announcement 
alone to join the European Union and European Monetary Union at a future date, did not 




Most economists agree on the fact that a country that wants to achieve high and 
sustainable economic growth needs to maintain low and stable inflation. In the transition 
countries, where pressures to use the inflation tax to help cover the government’s 
expenditures is strong, the choice of a monetary institution seems to be of utmost 
importance. In recent years the view that currency boards should be adopted in transition 
countries to add credibility and alleviate inflationary tendencies has divided economists.  
This paper first shows that, in transition economies, lower inflation levels are 
consistent with greater economic growth. Relying on statistical difference tests, we find 
that transition economies with non-discretionary regimes (those with currency boards or 
that experienced de facto exchange rate pegs) have more stable and lower rates of 
inflation relative to transition economies with central banks. Next, we use a panel model 
that builds off of the traditional model of inflation to test whether non-discretionary  
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regimes produce less inflationary bias. We also test to see if the transition economies that 
have committed to joining the European Monetary Union effectively import more 
credible monetary policy through self-discipline, and thus lower their inflation rates. We 
find across all specifications that adopting a non-discretionary regime is an effective way 
to achieve lower levels of inflation. It is also interesting to note that transition countries 
being on the fast track to join the European Monetary Union did not experience 
significantly lower inflation rates relative to those countries that are not on the fast track. 
Generally, the announcement to join the European Monetary Union has not had a 
noticeable impact on the inflation of the fast track countries, revealing that the 
announcement alone has not served as a non-institutional control on inflation. 
This paper strongly advocates that changes in monetary institutions towards those 
that limit discretionary power are necessary to significantly impact inflation in transition 
economies. Our results suggest that transition economies that replace existing central 
banking regimes with a non-discretionary regime should experience lower inflation 
because of the added monetary policy discipline. In other words, our findings show that 
transition economies can ‘import’ credible monetary policy by adopting currency boards 
and de facto pegs, to lower their inflation. This study helps to strengthen the existing 
literature on the benefits of adopting a currency board or a implementing “hard pegs.” 
These arrangements appear to be effective institutions to discipline monetary policy and 
help avoid the expansionary monetary policy bias coming from fiscal pressures that 
monetary authorities of transition economies often face.  
  Clearly this paper has focused on the direct effect of discretionary power on 
inflation; however, the costs of disinflation have not been examined. Our further research  
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will estimate the costs of disinflation of transition countries and investigate whether the 
costs of disinflation are lower when monetary institutions enjoy less discretionary power 
in controlling their monetary policy. The existing literature that analyses the cost of 
disinflation has mainly focused on OECD countries and has not given much attention to 
transition economies.  
  23
Figure 1 














































Comparing Inflation Variances and Average Annual Inflation Rates for  
Selected Transition Countries (1995-2002) 
 





Croatia 1.85  Bosnia 3.00  (-6.75) 
Bosnia 3.29  (96.61)  Croatia 4.19 
Slovenia 4.68  Macedonia 4.31 
Slovakia 7.39  Czech  Republic  6.30 
Czech Republic  10.91  Slovakia  7.84 
Macedonia 26.77  Latvia 8.28 
Bulgaria 36.97  (1854.41)  Slovenia 8.86 
Hungary 62.33  Bulgaria 9.14  (92.55) 
Poland 69.73  Lithuania 10.29 
Latvia 73.07  Albania  10.29 
Estonia 95.27  Estonia  11.04 
Albania 125.79  Poland 12.44 
Moldova 159.80  Hungary  14.86 
Lithuania 204.52 Moldova 20.03 
Kyrgyz Republic  206.60  Kyrgyz Republic  21.90 
Mongolia 422.82  Mongolia  22.85 
Romania 1755.96  Armenia 28.00 
Georgia 2990.36  Georgia 30.79 
Kazakhstan 3400.20  Kazakhstan 34.49 
Armenia 3655.93 Russia  53.93 
Russia 3954.19  Azerbaijan  53.96 
Uzbekistan 9241.96 Romania    54.4 
Ukraine 15935.64  Ukraine  69.38 
Azerbaijan 20967.64  Uzbekistan  70.38 
Tajikistan 51245.39  Tajikistan 158.64 
Belarus 52438.34  Belarus 183.28 
         
Non-discretionary Regime  73.36  Non-discretionary Regime  7.56 
Central Bank  7333.98  Central Bank  41.78 
Central Bank – Non-discretionary 
Regime  7260.62*** 
Central Bank – Non-discretionary 
Regime  34.22* 
Statistical Difference Test  F = 99.97  Statistical Difference Test  t = 1.87 
 




Transition economies with Non-discretionary regimes (currency boards or de facto exchange rate pegs) are in 
bold and italic print. For those countries that switched from central bank to currency board, their measures are 





Determinants of the Inflation Rates of Selected Transition Countries (1995-2001) 
 
Specifications     
   [a] [b] [c]  [d]  [e]  [f] 
             
Exchange Rate Regime Index  16.02***  14.91***      7.20  6.01 
   (3.78)  (3.60)      (1.29)  (1.13) 
Non-discretionary Regime      -212.66***  -212.83***  -156.09**  -165.70** 
        (4.31) (4.33) (2.36) (2.57) 
-38.12    -10.87  -22.89   Fast Track to Join European Monetary 
Union    (1.20)   (0.36)  (0.72)  
           
           
Budget Deficit (% of GDP)  3.22  3.42  5.74*  5.79*  4.91  5.13 
    (0.93)  (0.99) (1.67) (1.69) (1.41) (1.48) 
Real GDP Growth Rate (Lag 1 period)  -7.94***  -7.89***  -8.07***  -8.05***  -8.01***  -7.98*** 
    (5.95)  (5.90) (6.13) (6.14) (6.10) (6.09) 
Trade Volume (% of GDP)  0.66***  0.66***  0.69***  0.69***  0.68***  0.68*** 
    (6.06)  (6.04) (6.35) (6.37) (6.31) (6.32) 
Agriculture  Value  Added  (%  of  GDP) 6.07** 6.23** 7.20*** 7.25*** 6.89*** 7.03*** 
    (2.49)  (2.56) (2.98) (3.01) (2.84) (2.92) 
Independence of Central Bank  35.12  20.26  73.47  68.50  58.56  51.44 
    (0.39)  (0.23) (0.83) (0.79) (0.66) (0.58) 
           
           
Country  Fixed  Effects  YES  YES  YES YES YES YES 
         
R-Squared  0.58  0.58  0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Number  of  Observations  175  175  175 175 175 175 
 
Notes: Absolute t-ratios in parenthesis, estimated country fixed effects available upon request to the authors. 
Significance levels are represented by: 
*** 1%, 
** 5%, 
* 10%  
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